ABSTRACT
Introduction
Access to health services, education, food, water, housing, sanitation, and information as well as enjoyment of a basic level of income security are, human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Social protection is an important factor in enabling people to exercise these rights (UNDP, 2011). In recent past, Indian Parliament has passed many legislations towards achievement of these rights, such as National Rural Employment Guarantee Act that guarantees 100 days of work at minimum wage per family in a year, Right to Education Act that provides free and compulsory education for children between 6 and 14 till completion of elementary education in a neighborhood school. In the same spirit, Government of India (GOI) introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme known as Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in early 2008 that was initially designed to target only the Below Poverty Line (BPL) households, but has been expanded to cover other defined categories of unorganized workers. Given the large share of OOP payments in health care in India, RSBY is considered a very innovative scheme that relies on providing cashless health services to the beneficiary households without any paperwork with the use of smart cards (more details are provided in section 1.1) with only a marginal enrollment/renewal cost of 30 Indian Rupees (INR) (about $0.5) per year. 1 It covers up to five members of family. As of November, 2012, 33.19 million 1 The World Bank hailed RSBY as a model of good design and implementation with important lessons for other programs in India. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/efeatures.aspx?relid=69262 1 BPL families were enrolled in RSBY, and an estimated 165.9 million persons were a part of "BPL-families-with-a-RSBY-card" (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2012).
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of RSBY on RSBY beneficiary households' (Average Treatment Impact on the Treated, ATT) utilization of health services, per capita in-patient, out-patient, and total OOP expenditure. We distinguish betweeen utilisation of health services for short term morbidity and long term morbidity, and also consider different components of health expenditure such as hospitalization cost, medicine cost, and transportation cost. In addition, we also provide impact of RSBY on an individual's utilization of health services and expenditure conditional on having recieved medical treatment (i.e. actual patient). Using a nationally representative longitudinal survey, we combine difference-in-difference with matching to mitigate the self-selection issue that induces biases in impact evaluation of health insurances. Difference-in-difference with matching should take care of selection issues as long as the macro trend observed between treated and non-treated households remain same. Since we use the non-treated households from same area, and our propensity score matching does a good job in balancing the characteristics in baseline across RSBY and non-RSBY households, the assumption is likely to be satisfied.
The Indian experiment with social health insurance is not new, and several developing countries have recently used tax revenues to subsidize health insurance for informal-sector They examine the determinants of enrollment and drop-out from RSBY. Using household fixed effects, they found RSBY membership is not significantly associated with the likelihood of hospitalization. However, they find that RSBY membership to be associated with a reduction in OOP spending in Bihar but not in Uttar Pradesh.
We add to the literature in following way. First, we add to the growing literature on social health insurance (SHI) by evaluating a large SHI from a densely populated large country with a large share of OOP expenditures in health care. Second, unlike Johnson and Krishnaswamy (2012) and Karan et al. (2015) , our estimates are ATT and not ITT. Unlike Raza et al.
(2016) whose data is limited to three districts, our data is nationally representative, and our main estimates are based on difference in difference with matching. Third, in addition to the household level observations, we also use individual specific utilization of health services.
We are able to distinguish expenditure on short term morbidity vs long term morbidity as the financial implications of long term morbidities are more serious than short term morbidities. Moreover, we break the total OOP expenditure in different component, such as expenditure on hospital and doctor, medicines, and transportation. Fourth, we provide impact of RSBY on individual's utilization of hospital, government doctor, and total OOP expenditures conditional on actually having received medical treatment.
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The findings of the paper is following. The RSBY households in rural India are 2.8 parentage points more likely to report a household member being treated mostly driven by higher treatment for long term morbidities (4.8 percentage points higher). There is no statistically significant impact of RSBY on hospitalization rate of RSBY households. Importantly, although there is some evidence of reduced per person household OOP expenditure in rural India, those differences are not statistically significant. RSBY households in rural India spend lower on medicines. In urban India, we do not find any significant impact of RSBY on RSBY households' utilization of health service and expenditure on health. Conditional on having received medical treatment for a long term morbidity, an individual belonging to RSBY household in rural India is 4.6 percentage points more likely to get hospitalized, 4.2 percentage points more likely to seek advice from a government doctor, and spend considerably less on medicines. However, there is no significant impact of RSBYconditional upon a person having received medical treatment for long term morbidity in urban areas.
No significant impact of RSBY on the household OOP expenditures is worrisome given the objectives of the RSBY to provide cashless health services. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the RSBY only started in 2008 and many districts received the program in staggered way. Our 2011-12 data covers only the 1-4 years of the program's implementation, and hence runs the risk that the impacts may not yet have fully materialized as it takes considerable time to raise awareness among the poor households about their rights. As the RSBY beneficiaries get more aware about the potential services of the RSBY, it is possible that the impact of the RSBY is reflected more in the evaluation studies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 describes the RSBY program in detail. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 details the empirical strategy, and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)
The Unorganized Workers Social Security Act (2008) enacted by the Central Government recommended that the Central Government provide social security schemes to mitigate risks due to disability, health shocks, maternity and old age which all unorganized workers get annual premium per enrolled household. The insurer must agree to cover the benefit package prescribed by Government of India through a cashless facility that in turn requires the use of smart cards which conform to certain specifications and must be issued to all members.
Each contract is specified on the basis of an individual district in a state and the insurer agrees to set up an office in each district. While more than one insurer can operate in a particular state, only one insurer can operate in a single district at any given point in time.
The beneficiaries under RSBY are entitled to hospitalization coverage up to INR 30,000/-per annum on family basis, for most of the diseases that require hospitalization. 4 households from 309 districts. We further drop 1484 households from our sample, as those households were not surveyed in 2005. Thus our final sample include 32,618 households from 309 districts in India. There are 48 districts in the data which were not exposed to RSBY as RSBY was not implemented in those districts by 2011-12. We treat those districts as nonexposed and drop from our main analysis which focused on comparing RSBY households with non-RSBY households in RSBY districts.
Health spending is captured in the survey both through the household expenditure module, and individual health modules. Household consumption module collected total household expenditure for in-patient (in last 365 days) and out-patient services (in last 30 days).
The in-patient expenditure is divided by 12 to get monthly expenditure. In addition, the total in-patient and out-patient expenditures are divided by household size and adjusted for prices using rural/urban state-specific poverty lines. The per capita OOP expenditure for the household is derived by adding per capita in-patient and out-patient expenditure. In addition, we also construct share of per capita OOP in household budget by dividing the per capita OOP by per capita monthly household expenditure. We also create an indicator for household incurring catastrophic health expenditure if household total health expenditure is more than 20% of the household pre-health payment consumption expenditure.
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Individual health modules make an inquiry about each household member's health through questions about issues related to short-term morbidity such as coughs, fevers, and diarrhea, and long-term morbidity from chronic diseases ranging from asthma to cancer category.
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The health modules also collect detailed information about the medical treatment received for each individual conditional on short term (past 30 days) and long term morbidity (past 365 days) such as where the treatment was received, how many days were spent in hospital if any, days lost due to sickness, amount spent on doctors and hospital fees, medicines, and transportation. Majority of hospitalization cases are reported for long term morbidity.
We create alternative utilization and expenditure from individual health modules for each individual. To establish comparability in health expenditure for short term and long term morbidity, expenditure on long term morbidity reported in survey is divided by 12 to get a monthly estimate. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the outcomes variables defined at the household level for RSBY and non-RSBY households in RSBY exposed districts for baseline 2005 and 2012 data. RSBY households in rural areas are more likely to report long term illness, hospitalization, loan to meet medical expenses both in 2005 and 2012. Some of these differences may be a reflection of poor economic status of RSBY households as they are more likely to be below poverty line households. Importantly, the differences in OOP expenditures are not statistically significant. In urban India also, RSBY households are more likely to report illness, however, there is no significant difference in OOP expenditures. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics at the individual level conditional on a person reporting medical treatment for any long-term morbidity. We focus on long term morbidity as those expenses are more likely to be covered by RSBY rather than expenses on short term morbidity. The short term morbidities are generally not covered by RSBY unless it lead to hospitalization. The hospitalization rate for short-term morbidities is very low in our data. In rural India, conditional on getting treated for long term morbidity, there is no significant difference in hospitalization rate. However, rural households spend considerably less on medicines, hospital, and total OOP. 9 In contrast, there is no statistically significant difference in medical expenses in urban areas. A patient in urban area with RSBY coverage is more likely to be hospitalized and receive treatment from a government doctor in 2012.
Importantly, this is also true in baseline period for urban areas. 
Empirical Framework
We use the longitudinal data to implement a matching difference-in-difference (MDID). In the presence of longitudinal or repeated cross-section data, matching and DID can be combined to weaken the underlying assumptions of both methods (Blundell and Dais, 2009 ). We start with a simple model that assume the outcome for household i in time period t, y it , depends on household observables and unobservables in period t, and whether the household holds a RSBY health insurance.
where γ i is the household specific time invariant unobservables, δ t represents a time specific component, and ε it is household specific idiosyncratic shock. In period 0 (2005 in our context), none of the households had RSBY. In period 1 (2012 in our context), some households are covered while others are not. In other words, the treatment variable rsby i1 equals 0 in period 0, and it switches from 0 to 1 with positive probability in period 1. β captures the impact of RSBY.
More formally equation (1) can be written for each time period:
Differencing the equations (2) from (3) get rids of household time invariant unobservables (δ i ), and we are left with the following:
where T and C refer Treatment (RSBY households) and Control (non-RSBY households).
The expectation of the difference between the changes among the participants and the nonparticipants is equal to:
By careful selection of a subsample of 'treated' households (i.e. RSBY households) and 'untreated' households (i.e. non-RSBY households), and through matching each treated household with one or more untreated households who are similar in terms of observable variables, the differences in changes in outcomes due to differences in observables can be eliminated (Wagstaff et al., 2009 ). However, to recover impact of RSBY, we also need (a)
that the period-specific aggregate shock exhibit the same trend between the treated and untreated (i.e. ∆δ T = ∆δ C ), and (b) the expectation of the change in the idiosyncratic errors is zero among both the treated and untreated.
As argued by Wagstaff et al. (2009) , there is potentially two control group. One nonparticipants residing in RSBY districts, and another all households residing in districts where RSBY was not implemented by 2012. We construct our control group from the household residing in same RSBY exposed districts (i.e. we drop the districts that were not exposed to RSBY). One can argue that aggregate shock will grow more similarly among people living in the same geographic areas than among people living in different areas-an important consideration when evaluating a program like RSBY that is also specific to certain districts.
In essence, we compare average changes in outcomes before and after the introduction of RSBY between treated and untreated households, using matching to control for (initial) 
where T and C represent the treatment and comparison groups respectively, w ij is the weight placed on comparison observation j for the treated individual i and w i accounts for the reweighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample (Blundell and Dias, 2009).
Patient-level analysis
Another interesting question is to assess the impact of RSBY on those individuals who actually received some medical treatment. For this, we restrict our sample in both 2012 and 2005 to only those individuals who reported being treated for any long term disease in last 12 months, and treat both data sets as repeated cross section. 10 In this case, the matching-DID would be (Blundell and Dias, 2009):
where RCS implies repeated cross section, (T 1 , T 0 , C 1, C 0 ) stand for the treatment group (RSBY card holders) and control group (non-RSBY) after (2012) and before (2005) the program, and w G represent the weight attributed to individual j in group G and time t when comparing with the treated individual i.
Results
As discussed in the Data section, many characteristics are different between the RSBY and non RSBY households (Table 3) . Table 4 reports the results for the probit model used to obtain the propensity scores. All the explanatory variables are from 2005 data when RSBY was not available, and hence could not been effected by assignment of RSBY. In addition to the covariates reported in Table 4 , the probit model also control for district fixed effects.
As intended, having below poverty line card increases the probability of household holding RSBY card. Similarly, per capita income and consumption is negatively associated with having RSBY card in rural area, however, both these variables are statistically insignificant in urban areas. Having a casual job increases the probability of having RSBY in rural India as expected, however, it is statistically insignificant in urban areas. The socially disadvantaged group Scheduled Tribe households are more likely to have RSBY in rural areas but not in urban areas. Importantly, there seems little evidence of adverse selection after controlling for economic status. For example, in rural areas none of household health indicators are significant determinant of RSBY card. Moreover, signs of many of the coefficients on the health indicators are negative. These patterns are also visible in urban areas. Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the propensity scores before matching (the predicted probability of being covered by RSBY as estimated in Table 4 ) for RSBY households and non-RSBY households for rural and urban area separately. There is considerable overlap of the propensity scores across treatment (RSBY households) and control group (non-RSBY households). The distribution for the non-RSBY households is skewed, with the bulk of cases having a very small probability of being covered. However, given the large sample size of comparison group compared to treatment group (about 7:1), there are plenty of households with larger probabilities of being covered by RSBY but who are not actually covered by the RSBY. We impose the common support in all our matching estimators and do not lose any treatment observations because of lack of control observations.
In the matching literature, there are many methods used to match control observation to treated observations, and there is no consensus about the method of matching. For our main results, we use kernel matching.
11 Kernel matching defines a neighborhood for each treated observation and constructs the counterfactual using all control observations within the neighborhood weighing each observation based on the distance between the treated and the control being matched, where the weighting function is decreasing in distance. By using more observations per treated, kernel weights reduce the variability of the estimator when compared with nearest neighbor weights and produces less bias then nearest neighbor with many matches per treated (Blundell and Dias, 2004) . However, we also present the results with nearest neighbor matching with five neighbors.
In appendix Table A1 , we report the results of the balancing tests for rural and urban areas separately after matching. In urban areas, after matching, difference in only one covariate, indicator for Other Backward Castes, is marginally statistically significant (pvalue=0.048). Similarly, in rural areas, after matching except for the two variables, there is no statistically significant differences between RSBY and non-RSBY households. Thus matching does a good job in making the groups comparable, as after matching, there remains very little difference between RSBY and non-RSBY households on the observables. In Table   5 , we present alternative measure of effectiveness of matching: the pseudo-R regressors cannot be rejected after matching in both rural and urban areas. Hence, propensity score matching does a good job in achieving a comparable control group. Table 6 presents the MDID estimates for household level indicators. Column (3) of Table 6 presents the ATT estimates as percentage changes on pre-RSBY averages of RSBY households. In rural areas, the RSBY households are 3 percentage points more likely to report any morbidity, and most of this is driven by an increase in reported case for long term morbidity. Probably some of these increases are driven by increased detection of those diseases through improved access to medical facilities for RSBY households. Similar results are reflected in probability of someone in the household seeking treatment. There is no statistically significant impact of RSBY on the probability of a household member receiving treatment for short-term morbidity, however, RSBY households are 4.7 percentage points more likely to report medical treatment for a long-term morbidity. Moreover, although the impact of RSBY on the probability of a household member being hospitalized is positive, its not statistically significant.
In terms of financial protection, there is no impact of RSBY on the probability of a household reporting any OOP expenditure. There is some evidence that the RSBY reduces household per capita OOP expenditure, however, none of these differences are statistically significant. Importantly the negative impact of RSBY is reflected in out-patient services and not in in-patient services. RSBY covers the hospitalization cost, and hence expected to make a dent in the in-patient OOP expenditures. Column (4) and column (6) of Table 6 provide estimates for nearest neighbor matching and fixed effects. The results from nearest neighbor matching are similar to the kernel matching estimates. Importantly, the fixed effects estimates differ from MDID estimates quantitatively. Many of the impact estimates are larger in magnitude and statistically significant. Based on fixed effects estimates, one may conclude that RSBY not only increased utilization but also lower the burden of medical costs on beneficiary households. Table 7 presents the results for urban India. In urban India, there is no evidence of any impact of RSBY on any indicator except one. Surprisingly, the RSBY households are more likely to take a loan for medical purposes, and the other alternative estimates give similar finding as far as probability of taking a loan to meet medical expenses is concerned.
16
The nearest neighborhood estimates are similar to kernel matching estimates. However, the fixed effects estimates provide a very different story about RSBY impact in urban India.
Fixed effect estimates suggest that RSBY increased utilization in urban areas and importantly RSBY households spend less compared to non-RSBY households for inpatient and outpatient services. Nevertheless, based on short-term and long-term morbidity costs, fixed effects estimates suggest that RSBY households spend more although the estimates are not statistically significant. Similarly, there is no impact of RSBY on number of days lost due to long-term morbidity and number of days spent in hospital. The single difference estimates for rural areas suggest a positive impact of RSBY on the probability of a advice sought from government doctor, and reduced expenditure on medicine, which are similar to the findings from RCS MDID estimates. However, the single difference estimator suggest a a much larger and statistically significant reduction in OOP expenditure.
Patient-level results
For urban areas, there is no evidence of any impact of RSBY on a patient's utilization of hospital or government doctor. Surprisingly, the direction of impact of RSBY on expenditure on medicine and total OOP expenditure is positive although not statistically significant. The single difference estimates suggest similar conclusion except on the probability of a patient seeking advice from a government doctor.
Conclusion
The Government of India launched a national health scheme, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yo- We find some evidence of positive impact of RSBY on utilization of health services by RSBY households in rural India but not in urban India. The RSBY increased the probability of a household receiving treatment by 3 percentage points in rural areas. However, there is no evidence that the RSBY reduced per person OOP expenditure for RSBY households in both rural and urban areas. There is some evidence that the RSBY reduced expenditure on medicines for beneficiary households in rural India. Conditional on having received medical treatment for major morbidity, we find that RSBY increased probability of hospitalization and being treated by a government doctor in rural areas but no significant impact in urban areas. We also find lower expenditure on medicine for a RSBY cardholder patient in rural areas.
There are some limitations of the findings of this paper. Table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 30 
